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 ABSTRACT    
 
We develop an identity choice model within the context of a stereotyping-cum-signaling 
framework. The model allows us to explore implications of the fact that, when individuals can 
choose identity, then the distribution of abilities within distinct identity groups becomes 
endogenous. This is significant because, when identity is exogenous and if the ability 
distributions within groups are the same, then inequality of group reputations in equilibrium can 
only arise if there is a positive feedback between group reputation and individual human capital 
investment activities (Arrow, 1973; Coate and Loury, 1993). Here we show that when group 
membership is endogenous then the logic of individuals’ identity choices leads there to be a 
positive selection of higher ability individuals into the group with a better reputation. This 
happens because those for whom human-capital-investment is less costly are also those who 
stand to gain more from joining the favored group. As a result, ability distributions within 
distinct groups can endogenously diverge, reinforcing incentive-feedbacks. We develop the 
theoretical framework that can examine the positive selection and the endogenous group 
formation. The model implies that inequality deriving from stereotyping of endogenously 
constructed social groups is at least as great as the inequality that can emerge between 
exogenously given groups. 
 
 
 
 
본 논문은 고정관념(stereotypes)과 노동시장 신호(signaling)에 관한 이론적 틀에 
기반하여 개인의 정체성(identity) 선택에 관한 이론모형을 제시하고 있다. 사회집단 간의 
평판의 차이 및 이로 인한 집단 간 불평등은 사회집단에 대한 시장의 고정관념 및 이에 
상응하는 집단 구성원의 인적자본 투자수준에 의해 형성된다(Arrow[1973]; Coate and 
Loury[1993]). 한편, 이제까지의 학계의 논의는 개인들의 사회집단 선택 및 이에 따른 
사회집단 구성의 내생적 변화 가능성을 배제한 채 발전하여 왔다. 사회집단 간 평판의 차이가 
존재하고 동시에 개인들의 자발적 집단 선택이 가능한 상황이라면, 평판이 좋은 사회집단은 
집단의 구성원들이 보다 적극적으로 인적자본에 투자하는 ‘투자 확대’의 효과뿐만 아니라, 
평판이 상대적으로 떨어지는 사회집단에 비해 보다 우수한 인재들을 집단의 새로운 
구성원으로 맞아들이는 ‘집단 구성’의 효과를 동시에 누리게 된다. 이러한 집단 구성의 
내생성은 본질적으로 사회집단 간의 평판의 차이를 보다 확대시키는 결과를 낳게 되며,  
 
 
 ABSTRACT    
 
이렇게 확대된 평판의 격차가 우수한 인재의 집중을 보다 강화시킴으로써 집단 간 경제적 
불평등이 시간이 지남에 따라 악화되는 것이다. 본 논문은 노동시장 신호이론을 활용하여 
사회집단 선택의 내생성하에서의 집단 간 불평등의 균형점을 찾고 이들의 안정성에 관해 
논하고 있으며, 집단 구성의 내생성이 주어질 경우 그렇지 않은 경우에 비해 사회집단 간의 
경제사회적 불평등이 보다 심화될 수 있음을 이론적으로 증명하고 있다. 
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Ⅰ. Introduction 
We develop an identity choice model based on a stereotyping-cum-signaling 
framework. If a worker’s productivity is not perfectly observable, employers have an 
incentive to use the collective reputations of the identity groups to which job 
applicants belong in the screening process. A key feature of our model is that 
individuals belonging to a group with a good collective reputation have a greater 
incentive to invest in skills than do those who belong to a group with a poor 
reputation. And yet, given its greater rate of investment in skills, the former group 
will tend to maintain a better collective reputation than the latter. That is, there can 
be more than one self-confirming equilibrium in group reputations (Arrow, 1973; 
Coate and Loury, 1993). Previous work on such statistical discrimination has taken 
group identity as immutable, so that each individual is affected by the collective 
reputation of his own group only. We handle the dynamics between the collective 
reputation and the identity choice problem by relaxing this immutability assumption.  
   To illustrate the relevance of our model, consider one concrete example— the 
phenomenon commonly known as “passing.” This widely observed behavior is 
evidently an instance of identity choice. Talented young members in the group with 
a worse collective reputation may consider “passing” into the group with a better 
reputation when the return for such “passing” (e.g., better treatment in the labor 
market) outweighs its cost (e.g., loss of ties to one’s own kind.) Thus, it has been 
noted that a significant number of the blacks in the U.S. population consistently 
passes for White or some other race (Sweet, 2005).1 Moreover, many ethnic Koreans 
in Japan (most of whom descend from forced laborers in mines and factories who 
were brought to Japan from the Korean peninsula during the period of Japanese 
imperialism) are “passing” for native Japanese—by changing both their surnames 
and their given names when seeking formal employment or marriage. They have 
done so in order to escape negative stereotypes and prejudices against ethnic 
Koreans in Japan.2 
When passing for a member of the advantaged group with high reputation is not 
possible due to immutability, the most talented of the stereotyped group are more 
likely to seek styles of self-presentation that aim to communicate “I’m not one of 
THEM; I’m one of YOU!” because they are the ones who gain most by separating 
themselves from the mass (Loury, 2002). Taking the example of the Black population 
in the US, methods that are known to be used for “partial passing” are: affections of 
speech, dressing up rather than wearing casual clothes, spending more on 
conspicuous consumption, and migration to affluent residential areas (Charles et al., 
                                                                                                                                                    
1 The National Longitudinal Survey conducted by the Department of Labor of the US shows that 1.87 
percent of those who had originally answered “Black” to the interviewer’s race question in 1979 switched 
to either “White,” “I don’t know, ” or “other,” by 1998.  
2 Every year about 10,000 Koreans living in Japan, out of around 600,000 Korean descendants holding 
Korean nationality, choose to be naturalized, giving up their names and original nationality (Fukuoka et al., 
1998).  
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2009; Goffman, 1959). There is evidence that the more educated (or talented) blacks 
tend to speak standard American English rather than African American English 
(Grogger, 2011). That is, the most talented of the stereotyped group “pass for” the 
slightly better-off subgroup that maintains a higher reputation than the stereotyped 
population as a whole by adopting the cultural traits of the subgroup.  
This selective out-migration to the better-off subgroup may undermine solidarity 
in the disadvantaged population and cause conflict among them, such as the 
accusation of “Acting White” against the ones who practice the “partial passing” 
methods (Fryer and Torelli, 2010). However, there might be a social gain through 
this practice: at least some cultural subgroups of the stereotyped population might 
be able to recover their reputation when the talented young members gather around 
certain cultural traits. The usage of the observable cultural traits in the screening 
process can to some extent cure the social inefficiency caused by imperfect 
information about the true characteristics of workers. 
It is not only backward or disadvantaged groups whose behavior is captured by 
our model. The emergence of an elite social group out of a population can also be 
explained through identity choice behavior. Fang (2001) discussed the use of cultural 
instruments that are intrinsically irrelevant for productivity to form an elite group. 
He notes that this may help to an account for the complexity of elite etiquette in 
European (or Confucian) societies, as well as for the greater respect afforded to those 
with an “Oxford Accent.” Skilled and unskilled workers have different incentives to 
join a group with unique cultural traits that are expensive to obtain. Thus, the 
cultural group is treated preferentially by employers due to the higher fraction of 
skilled workers, even though the cultural traits of the group are not relevant for 
productivity. We may see an autonomously growing elite subgroup with 
differentiated cultural traits whose members are considered as distinguished from 
their peers. 
The identity choice model in this paper starts with a standard statistical 
discrimination framework (Coate and Loury, 1993). We identify multiple self-
confirming prior beliefs, which we call Phenotypic Stereotyping Equilibria (PSE). 
This multiplicity of phenotypic equilibrium explains inequality of collective 
reputations between exogenous and equally endowed identity groups as being due 
to positive feedback between a group’s reputation and its members’ investment 
incentives. But it entails no selection into or out of the groups. However, when 
membership is endogenous and if the groups’ reputations were to differ in 
equilibrium, then not only will members of a favored group face greater incentives to 
invest in human capital. It is also the case that the better-regarded group will, in 
equilibrium, come to consist disproportionately of high ability/low human capital 
investment cost types. These are the types who gain most from joining a favored 
group. The result is that human capital cost distributions between groups 
endogenously diverge, which reinforces incentive-feedbacks. We call such a group-
disparate equilibrium with positive selection a (non-trivial) Affective Stereotyping 
Equilibrium (ASE). 
For the development of our theoretical model, we introduce two affects (i.e., 
possible group identities), A and B. We assume that the cost to choose affect A rather 
than B varies across the population. Agents choose affect A if and only if the 
anticipated return exceeds the agent’s cost of choosing affect A. We further assume 
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that the cost distribution among agents for this affect choice is statistically 
independent of the cost distribution of human capital investment. (That is, a person’s 
identity orientation cannot be used to predict their economic abilities.) Nevertheless, 
we show that in the model’s equilibrium the more able individuals—those with 
lower human capital investment costs—will tend to choose affect A whenever the 
collective reputation of the affect A group is better than that of the affect B group. 
But, of course, their behaving in this way is what causes group A to have a better 
reputation in the first place! 
The main result which we demonstrate with this model is the following: group 
inequality that derives from the ascriptive stereotyping of endogenously constructed 
social groups is at least as great as the group inequality that can emerge from the 
phenotypic stereotyping of exogenously given groups. Again, this is due to the fact 
that when groups are endogenous then low human capital cost types are 
disproportionately drawn to the group with a better reputation, causing a skill 
disparity between groups to endogenously diverge, thereby justifying the disparity 
of group reputations. The model also implies that there exist multiple (non-trivial) 
Affective Stereotyping Equilibria whenever multiple Phenotypic Stereotyping 
Equilibria can be constructed in the labor market structure. 
The paper is organized into the following sections. Section 2 develops the model 
with the identify choice and skill investments. Section 3 defines Phenotypic and 
Affective Stereotyping Equilibria. Section 4 discusses the implications of the 
developed model and Section 5 concludes. 
Ⅱ. Model with the Identity Choice 
In this section, we display the general framework of the model that includes 
agents’ decision making and the payoff structure. The workers make an investment 
decision on skill acquisition and choose the identity type before they enter the labor 
market. Employers set the wage for each worker to be proportional to the worker’s 
expected productivity using both the productivity-related noisy signal and the 
identity type. The workers’ decision makings, the employers’ wage setting and the 
consequent expected payoff are discussed below. 
Workers’ Affective/Expressive Behavior: Agents choose affect  ∈ {, }. The cost 
to choose the affect A is k ∈ .  can be negative: the affect A can generate benefits 
for some agents. CDF of the affective behavior cost is denoted by (). We assume 
the affective symmetry: () = 1 − (−). Agents choose the affect A if and only if 
the anticipated return exceeds the agent’s cost k. Otherwise, they choose the affect B. 
WLOG, it is natural to assume that PDF of the cost , h(k), has one peak at =0: 
ℎ()>0 for any ∈(−∞, 0) and ℎ()< 0 for any ∈(0, ∞).3 
Workers’ Skill Acquisition Behavior: Agents choose whether to be skilled or not: 
∈{0, 1}. The cost to be skilled is  , which is non-negative. CDF of the skill 
                                                                                                                                                    
3 This is not a critical assumption in the model. We will have the identical conclusions with the 
uniform distribution of k. 
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acquisition cost is (), in which (0)≥0 and (∞)=1.4 WLOG, it is natural to 
assume that PDF of the cost , (), has one peak at ĉ : ()>0 for any ∈(0, ĉ ) 
and ()<0 for any ∈(ĉ, ∞). An agent chooses (=1) if the return from doing so 
exceeds that agent’s cost for the skill acquisition (). We impose that c and  are 
independently distributed. 
Employers’ Wage-setting Behavior: Skill e is not fully identified. Employers 
observe group identity and noisy signal  ∈  distributed conditional on e. PDF of 
the signal conditional on  is () and its CDF is (). Let us define the function 
(, ) as (, ) ≡ π() + (1 − )(), which indicates the distribution of signal 
 of agents belonging to a group of which the skill level(the fraction of the skilled  
workers) is believed to be . WLOG, we assume that ()() increases with respect to  
, which is denoted by MLRP: Monotonic Likelihood Ratio Property. The employers’  
belief that an agent with signal  is skilled is (, )(≡ [ = 1|, ]) = ()(,). 
Under MLRP, (, ) increases with both  and . The productivity of a skilled 
worker is  and that of an unskilled worker is zero. We assume that the wage is 
proportional to the expected skill level:  
 
(, ) =  · (, ), for some  > 0 
 
= ω · 
()
() + (1 − )()
.                                                                                    (1) 
 
Workers’ Payoffs: The expected wage from acquiring skill level  is denoted 
by ():  
 
 () =  ()(, )  ,


                                                                                                    (2) 
 
in which () is positive for any ∈{0,1}. Workers’ expected return acquiring 
human capital (()) is defined as  
 
() ≡ () − ().                                                                                                               (3) 
 
() is expressed as  
 
() =  (


() − ())(, )   
 
=   (
() − ())()
(, )


 .                                                                              (4) 
 
The followings can be easily seen  
 
                                                                                                                                                    
4 With G(c)≥0, we allow that a fraction of workers always invest for skills.  
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() =   (
() − ())()()
(, )


 ,                                                                          (5) 
 
 () = −2  (
() − ())()()
(, )


   (< 0).                                                    (6) 
 
Thus, () is concave and (0)= (1)=0, which implies that lim→  ()>0 and 
lim→  ()<0. Let us denote   {()} by : () = 0. 
The first derivatives of () and () are 
 
() =  


()()(, )  ,                                                                                   (7) 
 
() =  


()()(, )  .                                                                                   (8) 
 
Note that (0) =  and (1) = . Since we know (0) > 0 and (1) < 0, we 
have (1) >   and (0) > . It is more likely that () tends to increase as  
increases and () tends to decrease as  increases. 
Thus, a worker with cost , in a group believed to be investing at rate  has the 
payoff:  
 
(, ) = max{() − ; ()},                                                                                         (9) 
 
in which the function (, ) is increasing in (∵  () > 0, ∀ ∈ {0, 1}) and non-
increasing in . 
Ⅲ. Stereotyping Equilibrium  
In this section, we define the Phenotypic and Affective Stereotyping Equilibria 
and search for the properties of the equilibria. 
 
 
1. Phenotypic Stereotyping Equilibria  
 
Given the employers’ prior belief () about human capital investment rate in a 
population, the fraction of workers who choose (=1) is G(()). Let us denote an 
equilibrium belief/investment rate by  ∈ [0, 1]:  = (()). The set of all such 
equilibria is denoted by Ω  (Coate and Loury, 1993). Let us call them Phenotypic 
Stereotyping Equilibria (PSE). Inequality of collective reputation between exogenous 
groups in equilibrium is due to feedback between group reputation and individual 
investment activities. The individuals in a group with a better collective reputation 
have a greater incentive to invest in skills, and with their greater skill investment rate, 
the group maintains a better collective reputation, (and Vice Versa).  
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It is most likely that there exists either one or three equilibria in the economy, 
because () is S-shaped as displayed in Figure 1. Multiple equilibria   ∈ Ω  
create possibility of Phenotypic Stereotyping (PS) wherein groups are exogenously 
and visibly distinct, though equally well endowed. Nevertheless, they fare unequally 
in the equilibrium (Panel B of Figure 1).  
It is clear that the socially optimal level of human capital investment is (). 
However, human capital investment is socially inadequate in any PSE 
: () < () for any  ∈ Ω , because  () <   as  ∫ 

 () − () = 
 ∫ ()

 ()(, )
  > 0. This implies the social optimality can be further 
improved through the relaxation of the given constraints. 
 
 
2. Affective Stereotyping Equilibria  
 
Absent affective discrimination, workers choose ‘affect’ based on their “natural” 
orientation:  =  if >0 and  =  if  <0. This implies that the human capital 
cost distribution, namely (), is the same for both affective groups. Refer to Figure 
2 for the case with affective discrimination absent. However, when affective 
discrimination prevails in the labor market and group membership is endogenous, 
this is not true any more. Given that the initial reputations of the two affective 
groups differ, the favored group not only faces great human capital investment 
incentives, but it also consists disproportionately of low human capital investment 
cost types, who gain more from joining a favored group. Thereby, it will cause 
human capital cost distributions between groups to endogenously diverge, 
reinforcing incentive-feedbacks. 
The economic analysis of the story can be developed in the following way. Let  
be employer belief about human capital investment rate in affective group i. 
Consider two affective groups A and B. Let us define a function ∆(, ; ) as the 
payoff difference between a A-type worker and a B-type worker given their skill 
acquisition cost level c: ∆(, ; ) ≡ (, ) − ( , ) . Given  >  ,
∆(, ; )  is positive because  (, )/ > 0 . Note that ∆(, ; ) =
−∆( , ; ) and ∆(, ; ) = 0. 
An agent with the cost set (c, k) chooses affective behavior i=A if and only if 
∆(, ; ) ≥ . Otherwise, he chooses affective behavior i=B. Given that c and k 
are independent, the fraction of agents choosing (i=A) is given by  
 
Σ ≡  (∆(


, ; ))  ().                                                                                       (10) 
 
The fraction of workers choosing (i=A) and (e=1) is given by  
 
σ ≡  (∆(
()

, ; ))  ().                                                                                (11) 
 
Then, the fraction of agents choosing (i=B) is obtained using Σ = 1 − Σ  and 
∆(, ; ) = −∆( , ; ): 
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Σ ≡  (∆(


 , ; ))  ().                                                                                       (12) 
 
Consequently, the fraction of workers choosing (i=B) and (e=1) is given by  
 
σ ≡  (∆(
()

 , ; ))  ().                                                                                (13) 
 
Given the employer belief about human capital investment rates (, ), the 
actual investment rates for the affective groups denoted by (, ) and ( , ) 
are  
 
 { = 1| = , , }(≡ (, )) = 
/,
 { = 1| = ,  , }(≡ ( , )) = / .
                                                        (14) 
 
 
It is noteworthy that when employers’ belief is the same for both affective groups 
( = ), ∆( , ; ) is zero and we have () = (). This implies that the 
affective behavior does not affect the human capital investment activities: 
(, )= ( , )(= ()). 
An equilibrium with affective stereotyping (ASE) is defined as a pair of 
investment rates for the affective groups (∗ , ∗ ) ∈ [0, 1] such that ∗ = (∗ , ∗ ) 
and ∗ = (∗ , ∗). The set of all such equilibria is denoted by Ω. Note that 
every PSE corresponds to trivial ASE where differences in affect are uninformative: 
(, ) ∈ Ω if  ∈ Ω because (, ) = () = . Affective stereotyping 
discrimination occurs if and only if ∗ ≠ ∗ . 
Note that ∆( , ; ) can be expressed by  
 
∆(, ; ) = max {() − ; 0} + () − max {() − ; 0} − ().    (15) 
 
Using ()  and () , we have the following lemma concerning 
∆(, ; ):  
 
Lemma 1. For any  ≤   {(), ()} , ∆(, ; ) = ()−(). For any 
 ≥  {(), ()} , ∆(, ; ) = ()−().  For any c such that 
  {(), ()} <  <  {(), ()}, we have 
 
∆(, ; ) = 
()−() −           () ≥ (),
()−() +           () < ().
                                     (16) 
 
The above lemma is summarized in Figure 3. Panel A of the figure displays the 
case with  >   and panel B does the case with  < . It is easily seen that 
∆(, ; ) > 0 for any c if and only if  > . Therefore, we have the following 
result. 
 
Proposition 1. When employers have different beliefs about two affective groups ( ≠ ), 
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the number of workers who adopt the ‘affect’ corresponding to the favored employers’ belief is 
greater than that of workers who adopt the ‘affect’ with the less favored employers’ belief: 
 >     >      ,  ∈ {, }. 
 
That is, in the current setting with symmetric cost distribution, more than half 
workers adopt the ‘affect’ that corresponds to the more favorable employers’ 
belief:  Σ > .5  and  Σ < .5  if   >   for  any  ,  ∈ {, }. The Lemma 1 implies that 
∆(, ; ) is non-increasing with respect to c whenever () > (), and non-
decreasing whenever () > (). It leads to the following useful lemma. 
 
Lemma 2. Whenever () > (), the following holds: (, ) > (, ) and 
( , ) < ( , ). In a symmetric way, whenever () < (), the following 
holds: (, ) < (, )  and ( , ) > ( , ) . Even when  ≠  , the 
following holds if () = ():  (, ) = ( , ) =  (, ) = ( , ).  
 
The above lemma implies the following proposition.  
 
Proposition 2. The disproportionately more talented workers, whose human capital 
investment costs (c) are relatively lower, choose the ‘affect’ that corresponds to the greater 
return to human capital investment: given () > (), (, ) > ()  (, ) <
()       ,  ∈ {, }. 
Ⅳ. Implications and Further Discussion  
It is obvious that (x, x) is an affective stereotyping equilibrium for any phenotypic 
stereotyping equilibrium x because x = (x, x). These ASE are called trivial ASE in 
this paper. We are more concerned with the non-trivial ASE in which the affective 
group’s reputations differ in equilibria: x≠y. Intuitively, we can say that the existence 
of non-trivial ASE is guaranteed given the multiple PSE. Suppose that there exist 
three PSE (π, , ) in the given labor market structure as displayed in Panel B of 
Figure 1. Imagine that an affective group’s reputation is the level of  and the other 
affective group’s reputation is that of . Note that the following must be true given 
the multiple PSE: R(π )>R(π ). Then, the combination (,  ) cannot be stable 
because of Proposition 2: given ()>(), ( , )>G(R()) and ( , )< 
G(R()). That is, the skill investment rate of the entering cohort to the affective 
group with  is greater than the current skill level of the group G(R()), while 
that of the entering cohort to the other affective group with  is smaller than the 
current skill level of that group G(R()). The situation is well described in Panel A 
of Figure 3. Therefore, there must be at least two non-trivial ASE: one can emerge out 
of the initial combination (,  ) and the other out of the initial combination 
( , ). 
We also know that the skill difference between two entering cohorts ((, ) −
( , )) is greater than that between the two groups’ current skill levels ( − ). 
This implies that the inequality between endogenous groups in some non-trivial ASE 
can be greater than inequality between exogenous groups in any PSE.  
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Finally, to see how our model can be used to shed light on labor market 
phenomena other than ethnic/racial group inequality, let us consider the problem of 
“re-branding ex-cons.” The main feature of the labor market for ex-convicts is that 
employers wish to avoid associating with those who end up returning to criminal 
activity, but employers cannot be certain from information which among the 
convicts will and which will not do so. However, the convicts themselves are 
presumed to know their own intentions. Under this informational asymmetry, 
employers choose not to hire any ex-cons leaving all of them unemployed.  
Let us imagine a re-branding program run by the government along the following 
line: There is to be a certifiable and costly activity such that, before going into the 
labor market, ex-cons can elect to join this program or not. Those who will go 
straight are more willing to join the program than those who will return to crime 
because those going straight have greater gain from having a job in the market. The 
collective reputation of the ex-con subgroup with the program certificate improves 
with the greater fraction of ex-cons going straight joining the program, so that those 
with the program certificate will be hired and those without it will not be hired by 
employers in the labor market. That is, notwithstanding the informational 
asymmetry and the adverse selection issue in the market, a government can 
nevertheless design a costly program by means of which some ex-cons can credibly 
convey their good intentions to employers. The social efficiency can be achieved by 
the introduction of the costly program.  
Ⅴ. Conclusion 
In this paper, we develop an identity choice model that can explain social 
activities such as passing and selective out-migration from a stereotyped group, 
loosening the assumption of group identity immutability in standard statistical 
discrimination models. More talented members with low human capital investment 
cost have a greater incentive to identify themselves with a group that has a better 
collective reputation. The positive selection into a favored group plays a critical role 
in causing human capital cost distributions between groups to endogenously diverge. 
This model can be applied to many other social settings such as code switching 
(Goffman, 1959) and generating certificates to fight against negative stereotypes (e.g. 
re-branding ex-cons).  
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[Figure 2] Human Capital Investment with Affective Discrimination Absent 
 
 
[Figure 3] Human Capital Investment with Affective Discrimination 
 
Panel A. Case with  >  
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